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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 
the biggest question is often whether the individual is subject to a 
sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA”).1 The charge typically carries a maximum penalty of ten 
years’ imprisonment.2 However, the ACCA increases the statutory 
range from zero to ten years to fifteen years to life if the individual 
has three or more prior convictions that qualify as “violent 
felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s].”3 
Three routes exist by which a prior conviction can qualify as a 
“violent felony”—the elements clause, the enumerated-offenses 
clause, and the residual clause. Before 2015, courts safely housed 
most offenses within the residual clause.4 Then, on June 26, 2015, 
the Supreme Court issued its monumental decision in Johnson II, 
invalidating the residual clause.5 Subsequently, courts across the na-
tion have reevaluated whether offenses that once qualified under the 
residual clause continue to qualify as ACCA predicate offenses.6 
Usually, the answer depends on whether the offense qualifies under 
the elements clause.7 That clause requires courts to determine 
whether an offense has as an element “the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force” against another person, or, as the 
                                                                                                             
 1 “The ACCA is one of the most onerous mandatory sentencing provisions 
found in the federal criminal code.” Katherine Menendez, Johnson v. United 
States: Don’t Go Away, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2016, at 12, 13. 
 2 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a) (2012). 
 3 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
 4 See infra Section IV.B. 
 5 Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
 6 See, e.g., United States v. Swopes, 886 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc); 
United States v. Jones, 877 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Gard-
ner, 823 F.3d 793, 801–02 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260, 
1262 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751, 753–55 (7th Cir. 
2016); United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 683 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 7 See supra note 6. 
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Supreme Court put it in Johnson I, whether the offense requires “vi-
olent force.”8 
Since Johnson II, the tension within the Eleventh Circuit has 
been palpable. There has been substantial and fervent disagreement 
about the meaning of Johnson I and the reach of Johnson II, and 
rightfully so. These decisions are important. They affect whether 
scores of people are condemned to serve years—if not decades—of 
additional prison time.9 Given the importance of these issues, this 
Article examines that tension, including three ways the court got it 
wrong—specifically, the court’s unusual conduct in ruling on re-
quests to file second or successive post-conviction motions based on 
Johnson II, and recent rulings on whether the Florida offenses of 
robbery and felony battery qualify as ACCA predicate offenses.10 
II. THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT & BACKGROUND 
PRINCIPLES 
The ACCA is a recidivist sentencing enhancement that applies 
to defendants convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted 
felon.11 Normally, this conviction carries a statutory maximum sen-
tence of ten years’ imprisonment for such convictions.12 But if a de-
fendant has three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony” or 
a “serious drug offense,” the ACCA requires a mandatory minimum 
sentence of fifteen years.13 The ACCA defines a “violent felony” as 
a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that: (1) 
“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of phys-
ical force against the person of another” (“the elements clause”); (2) 
“is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives” (“the 
enumerated-offenses clause”); or (3) “otherwise involves conduct 
                                                                                                             
 8 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i); Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 
133, 140 (2010). 
 9 See United States v. Gundy, 842 F.3d 1156, 1179 (11th Cir. 2016) (Jill 
Pryor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (“In recent years, around 700 de-
fendants each year have been convicted in [the Eleventh] Circuit of being a felon 
in possession of a firearm . . . . These numbers . . . mean that thousands of defend-
ants stand to have their sentences increased by at least five years . . . .”). 
 10 See infra Parts IV & V. 
 11 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012). 
 12 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). 
 13 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 
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that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” 
(“the residual clause”).14 
Determining whether an offense satisfies one of the ACCA 
clauses implicates several highly technical legal principles, and 
those principles may apply differently depending on the clause at 
issue. For example, in analyzing whether a prior conviction qualifies 
as a “violent felony,” courts must use a categorical approach, exam-
ining only the statutory elements of an offense, rather than the facts 
underlying a conviction.15 However, the categorical approach is ap-
plied differently depending on the clause involved. Under the ele-
ments clause and enumerated-offenses clause, courts must assume 
an offense was committed by the least of the acts criminalized under 
the state statute.16 The residual clause, on the other hand, requires 
                                                                                                             
 14 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 15 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). The only instance in 
which a court may look at the records relating to a defendant’s prior conviction is 
if the defendant’s statute of conviction is “divisible,” meaning the statute sets forth 
alternative elements that a jury must choose between, and one of the alternatives 
would not qualify as a “violent felony.” See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 
254, 257–58 (2013). This is called the modified categorical approach, and under 
this approach, courts may examine a limited universe of judicially-approved ma-
terials called Shepard documents, including the indictment, jury instructions, and 
plea agreement, to determine the element under which the defendant was con-
victed. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). The Supreme Court 
has cautioned, however, that the modified categorical approach “merely helps im-
plement the categorical approach when a defendant was convicted of violating a 
divisible statute.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263. If a statute does not set forth alter-
native elements, but a single “indivisible” element, the modified categorical ap-
proach does not apply. Id. at 258–59. Often, the line between a divisible, disjunc-
tively phrased set of elements and an indivisible, disjunctively phrased set of fac-
tual means of accomplishing a single element can be murky. See Mathis v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). But the Supreme Court has clarified that 
elements are the “things [that] must be charged” in a statute for conviction, while 
means “need not be.” Id. at 2256. If a statute comprises indivisible means, courts 
must apply the categorical approach, without using Shepard documents to identify 
which means was committed. Id. at 2255. 
 16 Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013) (citing Johnson I, 559 
U.S. 133, 137 (2010)) (describing the least-culpable-act rule); see United States 
v. Braun, 801 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 
138). 
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courts to determine the conduct and degree of risk involved in the 
“ordinary case” of an offense.17 
In Johnson II, the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause, 
forcing courts across the nation to reconsider whether convictions 
which had qualified under the residual clause still qualified under 
the elements or enumerated-offenses clauses.18 Most of these eval-
uations revolved around the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
elements clause in Johnson I.19 
A. The Residual Clause & Johnson II 
In Johnson II, the Supreme Court struck down the ACCA’s re-
sidual clause as unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause.20 According to the Johnson II Court, 
“[t]wo features of the [ACCA’s] residual clause conspire[d] to make 
it unconstitutionally vague.”21 First, it required judges to determine 
what kind of conduct the “ordinary case” of a crime involves.22 
Judges then had to determine whether their judicially-imagined “or-
dinary case” posed enough of a risk to qualify as a “violent fel-
ony.”23 As the Supreme Court clarified in Welch v. United States: 
The vagueness of the residual clause rests in large 
part on its operation under the categorical ap-
proach . . . . For purposes of the residual clause, then, 
courts were to determine whether a crime involved a 
                                                                                                             
 17 See Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 607–10 (3d Cir. 2016) (con-
trasting the least-culpable-act inquiry with the ordinary-case inquiry). 
 18 Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
 19 See Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140. 
 20 Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The void-for-vagueness doctrine bars the 
Government from “taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a crim-
inal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it 
punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Id. at 2556 (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
 21 Id. at 2557; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018). 
 22 Id. (stating that the ACCA’s residual clause left “grave uncertainty about 
how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” since “[i]t ties the judicial assessment 
of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime”). 
 23 Id. at 2558 (“It is one thing to apply an imprecise ‘serious potential risk’ 
standard to real-world facts; it is quite another to apply it to a judge-imagined 
abstraction.”). 
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“serious potential risk of physical injury” by consid-
ering not the defendant’s actual conduct but an “ide-
alized ordinary case of the crime.” 
The Court’s analysis in Johnson [I] thus cast no 
doubt on the many laws that “require gauging the 
riskiness of conduct in which an individual defendant 
engages on a particular occasion.” The residual 
clause failed not because it adopted a “serious poten-
tial risk” standard but because applying that standard 
under the categorical approach required courts to as-
sess the hypothetical risk posed by an abstract ge-
neric version of the offense. In the Johnson [I] 
Court’s view, the “indeterminacy of the wide-rang-
ing inquiry” made the residual clause more unpre-
dictable and arbitrary in its application than the Con-
stitution allows. “Invoking so shapeless a provi-
sion . . . does not comport with the Constitution’s 
guarantee of due process.”24 
Thus, the Supreme Court held that increasing a defendant’s sen-
tence under the residual clause is a denial of due process.25 
B. The Elements Clause & Johnson I 
Without the residual clause, the validity of thousands of ACCA 
enhancements now depends on whether predicate convictions qual-
ify under the elements clause—in other words, whether certain of-
fenses have as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force” against another person.26 Five years before John-
son II, the Supreme Court clarified the limits of what constitutes 
“physical force” under the elements clause in Johnson I.27 
Johnson I stemmed from the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that a 
Florida conviction for simple battery committed by touching another 
person against his will was a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s 
                                                                                                             
 24 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2016) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 25 Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. 
 26 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
 27 Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 
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elements clause.28 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address 
the “physical force” requirement for the first time.29 The Johnson I 
Court held that in the context of the statutory definition of a “violent 
felony,” “physical force” means “violent force—that is, force capa-
ble of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”30 The 
Court observed that “[e]ven by itself, the word ‘violent’ . . . connotes 
a substantial degree of force.”31 Notably, in defining “physical 
force,” the Court relied on Flores v. Ashcroft, a Seventh Circuit de-
cision holding that “physical force” means force “intended to cause 
bodily injury, or at a minimum likely to do so.”32 And because a 
Florida simple battery committed by a mere “touch” does not cate-
gorically require violent force, the Supreme Court held it does not 
satisfy the elements clause.33 
III. WELCH AND THE SUMMER OF SOS ORDERS 
After Johnson II, a question of considerable importance was 
whether prisoners whose sentences were based on the ACCA’s re-
sidual clause would be able to benefit from Johnson II under 28 
                                                                                                             
 28 United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008). The Flor-
ida battery statute provides that a simple battery occurs when a person “1. 
[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of 
the other; or 2. [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person.” 
§ 784.03(1)(a), FLA. STAT. (2017). Because the Shepard documents in Johnson I 
did not allow the district court to conclude the battery conviction rested on any-
thing more that the least culpable act, the conviction was presumed to have rested 
on an intentional, unwanted touching. Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 137. Typically, a 
conviction for simple battery is a misdemeanor, but it becomes a felony if the 
defendant has a previous battery conviction. § 784.03(1)(b)–(2), FLA. STAT. 
 29 See Daija M. Page, Forcing the Issue: An Examination of Johnson v. 
United States, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1191, 1197 (2011). 
 30 Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140 (citing Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672 
(7th Cir. 2003)) (“We think it clear that in the context of a statutory definition of 
‘violent felony,’ the phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force 
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”). 
 31 Id. (“When the adjective ‘violent’ is attached to the noun ‘felony,’ its con-
notation of strong physical force is even clearer.”). 
 32 Flores, 350 F.3d at 672. 
 33 Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 139 (noting that the plain meaning of “force” sug-
gests “a degree of power that would not be satisfied by the merest touching”). 
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U.S.C. § 2255, the primary vehicle by which prisoners seek to va-
cate, set aside, or correct their judgments.34 The answer would affect 
inmates across the nation. And to be sure, the issue was time-sensi-
tive. Under § 2255(f)(3), prisoners have only one year from the date 
the Supreme Court recognizes a new right to file a § 2255 motion, 
if the right applies retroactively on collateral review.35 The rules are 
even stricter for inmates who have previously filed a § 2255 mo-
tion.36 
Once an inmate files one § 2255 motion, he cannot file a “second 
or successive” § 2255 motion unless the new right: (1) is “a new rule 
of constitutional law”; (2) “made retroactive . . . by the Supreme 
Court”; and (3) the court of appeals grants the inmate permission to 
file such a motion.37 Most inmates seeking post-conviction relief 
                                                                                                             
 34 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012) (“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a 
court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the 
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sen-
tence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is 
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sen-
tence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”). 
 35 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a mo-
tion under this section. The limitation period shall run from . . . the date on which 
the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has 
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable 
to cases on collateral review . . . .”). Inmates have one year to file a post-conviction 
motion, and that one-year clock begins to run based on the occurrence of one of 
four triggering events. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The most common triggering event is 
the date the prisoner’s “judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(f)(1). However, another one is when the Supreme Court recognizes a new 
right, and that new right applies retroactively on collateral review. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(f)(3). When that happens, prisoners have a year from the date of the Su-
preme Court’s decision to file a § 2255 motion. Id. 
 36 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255(h) (2012). 
 37 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (“A second or successive motion must be certified 
as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to con-
tain . . . a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive . . . by the Supreme 
Court, that was previously unavailable.”) (emphasis added); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(2)(A) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus ap-
plication . . . shall be dismissed unless . . . the applicant shows that the claim relies 
on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court, 
that was previously unavailable . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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based on Johnson II had to file “second or successive” § 2255 mo-
tions.38 The problem was that the Eleventh Circuit held Johnson II 
was only retroactively applicable in a first § 2255 motion, but not in 
a second or successive § 2255 motion.39 Therefore, a little more than 
six months after Johnson II, the Supreme Court stepped in once 
again.40 Recognizing that time was of the essence, the Court issued 
its decision in Welch v. United States about three months after grant-
ing certiorari (and, remarkably, only nineteen days after oral argu-
ment).41 
A. Welch v. United States 
The question presented in Welch was whether the Eleventh Cir-
cuit erred in denying Mr. Welch a certificate of appealability 
                                                                                                             
 38 See In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x 765, 771–72 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., 
concurring) (“Most ACCA prisoners already filed a § 2255 motion years ago, so 
the only way for them to get relief based on the Johnson [II] decision is to come 
to a court of appeals and ask for permission to file another § 2255 motion in dis-
trict court.”). 
 39 Compare Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728, 737 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e 
hold that Johnson applies retroactively on collateral review to prisoners seeking 
habeas relief for the first time.”), with In re Franks, 815 F.3d 1281, 1283–86 (11th 
Cir. 2016), abrogated by In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding 
that Johnson II is not retroactive for purposes of second or successive § 2255 
motions because the Supreme Court had not “made” Johnson [II] retroactive), and 
In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 989 (11th Cir. 2015), abrogated by In re Thomas, 823 
F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Although we agree that Johnson [II] announced a 
new substantive rule of constitutional law, we reject the notion that the Supreme 
Court has held that the new rule should be applied retroactively on collateral re-
view.”). See also In re McCall, 826 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., 
concurring) (“We were in the minority of courts that, from the beginning, said 
prisoners could not benefit from Johnson [II] if they had already filed an earlier 
§ 2255 motion.”); In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x at 777 (Martin, J., concurring) 
(quoting In re Franks, 815 F.3d at 1289 (Martin, J., dissenting)) (“For months, 
[Franks] ‘denied the application of Johnson [II] to potentially hundreds of people 
based on pro se pleadings and without oral argument or briefing.’”). 
 40 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 790, 790 (2016) (mem.) (granting certi-
orari on January 8, 2016). 
 41 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016) (reversing the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 18, 2016); In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x at 
773 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Nineteen days later, the Welch decision abrogated 
our court’s precedent . . . .”). During those three months, the Eleventh Circuit was 
the only circuit that refused to stay applications for leave to file second or succes-
sive § 2255 motions. See id. at 777. 
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(“COA”)42 on, among other things, whether his sentence was uncon-
stitutional in light of Johnson II.43 To decide that narrow issue, how-
ever, the Court had to resolve a broader legal question—whether 
Johnson II applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.44 The 
answer would affect thousands of inmates in the Eleventh Circuit.45 
To resolve that question, the Court applied the framework set forth 
                                                                                                             
 42 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), the denial of a § 2255 motion cannot be appealed unless a circuit judge 
or district court judge issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2012). To obtain a 
COA, a movant must make a “substantial showing” that his constitutional right 
has been denied. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). That standard is satisfied if a movant 
can show that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree 
that) the [motion] should have been resolved in a different manner.” Slack v. 
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 475 (2000). “[A] claim can be debatable even though 
every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the case 
has received full consideration, that [the movant] will not prevail.” Miller-El v. 
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003). 
 43 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264. A brief background about Mr. Welch’s case: In 
2010, Gregory Welch was sentenced to the ACCA’s mandatory minimum term of 
15 years’ imprisonment based, in part, on a 1996 Florida conviction for robbery. 
Id. at 1262. At sentencing, he objected that the conviction did not qualify as a 
“violent felony” under the ACCA. Id. The district court, however, overruled that 
objection, and on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. 
Id. at 1263. The district court ruled Welch’s robbery conviction qualified under 
both the elements clause and the residual clause, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
based solely on the residual clause. Id. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id. 
(citing Welch v. United States, 568 U.S. 1112 (2013) (mem.) (denying certiorari 
on January 7, 2013). In December 2013, Mr. Welch moved pro se for the vacatur 
of his sentence under § 2255, arguing that his Florida robbery conviction itself 
was vague, and his attorney was ineffective by allowing him to be sentenced under 
the ACCA. Id. The district court denied the motion and a COA. Id. Mr. Welch 
appealed and moved for a COA in the Eleventh Circuit. Id. In his motion, he noted 
Johnson II was pending in the Supreme Court and argued his ACCA sentence was 
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. Id. In June 2015, less than three 
weeks before Johnson II, the Eleventh Circuit denied Mr. Welch’s motion for a 
COA. Id. After Johnson II, Mr. Welch sought an extension of time to petition for 
reconsideration, but the motion was returned to him unfiled because the time to 
seek reconsideration had already expired. Id. The Supreme Court then granted Mr. 
Welch’s pro se petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. 
 44  Id. at 1261 (“The present case asks whether Johnson is a substantive deci-
sion that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.”). Notably, because the 
United States agreed with Mr. Welch that Johnson II applies retroactively, the 
Supreme Court appointed independent counsel as amicus curiae to argue against 
retroactivity. Id. at 1263. 
 45 See infra Part III.B. 
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by Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane.46 Under 
Teague, the general rule is that “new constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure” are not retroactively applicable on collateral review.47 
However, two categories of rules are not subject to this general 
bar—new substantive rules and new watershed rules of criminal 
procedure.48 The parties in Welch agreed that Johnson II announced 
a new rule of constitutional law.49 The parties also agreed that the 
new rule announced in Johnson II was not a new watershed rule of 
criminal procedure.50 The question, then, was whether the new rule 
announced in Johnson II was a “substantive rule” or a “procedural 
rule.”51 The Welch Court held that Johnson II announced a substan-
tive rule because it changed the reach of the ACCA, not the judicial 
                                                                                                             
 46 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (discussing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 
(1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)). Teague was decided in the context of a 
federal collateral challenge to a state conviction, while Welch involved a chal-
lenge to a federal conviction. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly 
held the Teague framework applies under such circumstances, for purposes of this 
case, the parties and the Court assumed it did. Id. 
 47 Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 310). 
 48 Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) and Saffle v. 
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)). 
 49 Id. (“It is undisputed that Johnson announced a new rule.”). “[A] case an-
nounces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on 
the . . . Government.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. “To put it differently, a case an-
nounces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time 
the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. A holding is only dictated by prec-
edent if it would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” Lambrix v. Sin-
gletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528–29 (1997). However, a case does not announce a new 
rule “when it is merely an application of the principle that governed a prior deci-
sion to a different set of facts.” Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347–48 
(2013) (internal quotes and alterations omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 307). 
 50 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (“The parties agree that Johnson does not fall 
into the limited second category for watershed procedural rules.”). A new water-
shed rule of criminal procedural implicates “the fundamental fairness and accu-
racy of the criminal proceedings.” Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495. “Although the precise 
contours of this exception may be difficult to discern,” the Supreme Court has 
generally cited Gideon v. Wainwright, which held “that a defendant has the right 
to be represented by counsel in all criminal trials for serious offenses, to illustrate 
the type of rule coming within the exception.” Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 (citing Gid-
eon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)). 
 51 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264–65. A rule is substantive if it “alters the range of 
conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes,” including rules “that narrow 
the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms,” and “constitutional de-
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procedures by which the statute is applied, and therefore, Johnson 
II applied retroactively.52 The Court, however, declined to wade into 
the merits of Mr. Welch’s motion, remanding the case to the Elev-
enth Circuit to decide whether Mr. Welch’s Florida conviction for 
robbery still qualified as an ACCA predicate offense under the ele-
ments clause.53 
B. The Summer of SOS Orders 
After Welch was issued on April 18, 2016, inmates had slightly 
more than two months—until the one-year anniversary of Johnson 
II—to submit applications to the Eleventh Circuit for leave to file 
second or successive § 2255 motions, obtain approval, and file the 
motions in the district court.54 Thousands did.55 
                                                                                                             
terminations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute be-
yond the [government’s] power to punish.” Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–53. On the 
other hand, procedural rules regulate “the manner of determining the defendant’s 
culpability.” Id. at 353. For example, rules that alter “the range of permissible 
methods for determining whether a defendant’s conduct is punishable.” Id. 
 52 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. The Court noted that not every decision altering 
the scope of a statute is a substantive decision. Id. at 1268. For example, a decision 
altering the scope of a procedural statute, such as one regulating the admission of 
evidence at trial, would itself be a procedural decision, and not retroactive on col-
lateral review. Id. 
 53 Id. (“It may well be that the Court of Appeals on remand will determine on 
other grounds that the District Court was correct to deny Welch’s motion to amend 
his sentence. For instance, the parties continue to dispute whether Welch’s strong-
arm robbery conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause of 
the Act, which would make Welch eligible for a 15-year sentence regardless of 
Johnson.”). 
 54 “[A]n inmate has one year to petition for relief, from the date the Supreme 
Court initially recognized a right, not from the date the Supreme Court held the 
right to be retroactively applicable.” In re Jones, 830 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 
2016) (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring) (citing Dodd v. United States, 
545 U.S. 353 (2005)). Notably, “Welch is the Supreme Court’s first ever § 2255 
case to make a new rule of constitutional law retroactive less than a year after the 
rule was announced.” In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 55 See In re Jones, 830 F.3d at 1301 (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring) 
(“[A]long with our regular workload, in the three months alone since Welch is-
sued, we have also received more than 1,800 Johnson-based requests for authori-
zation.”); In re Clayton, 829 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin & Pryor, 
JJ., concurring) (“In the last couple of months, this court has received hundreds of 
these applications from prisoners who want relief based on the Supreme Court’s 
1142 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1130 
 
The circumstances under which the Eleventh Circuit rules on 
these applications are unusual. When ruling on such applications, 
the court must determine whether the applicant makes a “prima facie 
showing” that his claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law 
made retroactive by the Supreme Court.56 The applications are typ-
ically filed pro se, on a form provided by the Eleventh Circuit, with 
no briefing.57 The court must rule on them within 30 days.58 If a 
claim is rejected, an applicant cannot bring the claim again, even if 
there is a later change in the law that shows he should have been 
granted authorization.59 What’s more, the Eleventh Circuit’s rulings 
on these applications cannot be reconsidered by the court or re-
viewed by the Supreme Court.60 
                                                                                                             
ruling in Johnson.”); In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x 765, 771 (11th Cir. 2016) (Mar-
tin, J., concurring) (“Judges on this nation’s courts of appeals have now witnessed 
a flood of applications coming from inmates who believe that Johnson may mean 
their sentence is no longer valid.”). 
 56 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C), (d)(1)(C) (2012). A prisoner may also seek au-
thorization when his claim relies on “newly discovered evidence that . . . would 
be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-
finder would have found the movant guilty of the offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) 
(2012). 
 57 See United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(Martin, J., concurring) (“These applications are almost always filed by prisoners 
with no lawyers. They include no briefs. In fact, the form used by prisoners for 
these applications forbids the prisoner from filing briefs or any attachments, un-
less the form is filed by a prisoner suffering under a death sentence.”). 
 58 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D) (“The court of appeals shall grant or deny the 
authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after 
the filing of the motion.”). It seems that the Eleventh Circuit “is the only court to 
force a decision on every one of these cases within 30 days of filing.” In re Leon-
ard, 655 F. App’x at 777 (Martin, J., concurring). Other courts have held that the 
thirty-day limitations period is advisory rather than mandatory. Orona v. United 
States, 826 F.3d 1196, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); In re Siggers, 132 
F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 59 In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (stating 
that § 2244(b)(1) provides that a repetitious filing “shall be dismissed,” and noting 
that the word “shall” does not convey discretion); see In re Parrish, No. 17-11523, 
slip op. at 4 (11th Cir. May 5, 2017) (Martin, J., concurring) (“So we now know 
that, as he has told us all along, Mr. Parrish’s ACCA sentence is not lawful . . . . 
But again, because this panel made a mistake in denying Mr. Parrish’s first appli-
cation, Baptiste prevents us from even considering his application today.”). 
 60 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (“The grant or denial of an authorization by a 
court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable 
and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”). 
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In the four months after Welch, the Eleventh Circuit ruled on 
hundreds of Johnson II-based applications (“SOS orders”).61 Of the 
hundreds, 33 were published.62 That means the court, racing to issue 
orders in a short 30-day window, created unreviewable precedent 
based on forms filled out by pro se prisoners. Many, if not most, of 
those decisions were splintered.63 And in ruling on these applica-
tions, the Eleventh Circuit went beyond merely determining whether 
                                                                                                             
“This means no motion for reconsideration, no motion for en banc review, no 
appeal, and no petition for cert. The decisions [the Eleventh Circuit] make[s] in 
these cases are therefore, as a practical matter, not reviewable.” In re Leonard, 
655 F. App’x at 778 (Martin, J., concurring). 
 61 See in re McCall, 826 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., con-
curring) (“[I]n the two months since Welch, . . . our court has denied hundreds of 
applications to file § 2255 motions based on Johnson [II] . . . .”) (citations omit-
ted). 
 62 See In re Welch, 884 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2018); In re Hernandez, 857 
F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2017); In re Parker, 832 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2016); In re 
Chance, 831 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Moore, 830 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 
2016); In re Bradford, 830 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Jones, 830 F.3d 1295 
(11th Cir. 2016); In re Sams, 830 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Gomez, 830 
F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Anderson, 829 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2016); In 
re Davis, 829 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Burgest, 829 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 
2016); In re Watt, 829 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Clayton, 829 F.3d 1254 
(11th Cir. 2016); In re Smith, 829 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Hunt; 835 
F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016); In re 
Gordon, 827 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Parker, 827 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 
2016); In re Sapp, 827 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Williams, 826 F.3d 1351 
(11th Cir. 2016); In re Colon, 826 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Jackson, 826 
F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2016); In re McCall, 826 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2016); In re 
Rogers, 825 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Hires, 825 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 
2016); In re Adams, 825 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Hines, 824 F.3d 1334 
(11th Cir. 2016); In re Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Pinder, 824 
F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2016); In re 
Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Robinson, 822 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 
2016). 
 63 See, e.g., In re Parker, 832 F.3d at 1250–51 (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., 
concurring); In re Chance, 831 F.3d at 1342 (Tjoflat, J., concurring); In re Jones, 
830 F.3d at 1297–1305 (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring); In re Gomez, 
830 F.3d at 1228–29 (Carnes, J., concurring); In re Anderson, 829 F.3d at 1294–
97 (Martin, J., dissenting); In re Davis, 829 F.3d at 1300–02 (Carnes, J., dissent-
ing); In re Clayton, 829 F.3d at 1256–67 (Martin & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring); id. 
at 1267–76 (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring); In re Smith, 829 F.3d at 
1281–85 (Jill Pryor, J., dissenting); In re Hunt, 835 F.3d at 1278–89 (Wilson, Jill 
Pryor, & Rosenbaum, JJ., concurring); In re Sapp, 827 F.3d at 1336–41 (Jordan, 
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an individual made a “prima facie showing.”64 Instead, the court 
combed through each prisoner’s record, publishing orders that 
delved into the merits of inmates’ Johnson II claims, including 
whether certain offenses have as an element the use of “physical 
                                                                                                             
Rosenbaum, & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring); In re Colon, 826 F.3d at 1306–08 (Mar-
tin, J., dissenting); In re McCall, 826 F.3d at 1309–12 (Martin, J., concurring); In 
re Fleur, 824 F.3d at 1341–44 (Martin, J., concurring); In re Pinder, 824 F.3d at 
979–81 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); In re Robinson, 822 F.3d at 1197–1201 (Martin, 
J., concurring); see also In re McCall, 826 F.3d at 1311–12 n.6 (Martin, J., con-
curring) (listing over 20 splintered decisions in unpublished opinions). 
 64 See In re Moss, 703 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jordan v. 
Sec’y., Dep’t of Corr., 485 F.3d 1351, 1358 (11th Cir. 2007)) (stating that a prima 
facie showing “is a limited determination” and that “‘[t]he district court is to de-
cide the [§ 2255(h)] issue[s] fresh, or in the legal vernacular, de novo.’”). The 
Moss Court explained that 
[s]hould the district court conclude that [an applicant] has es-
tablished the statutory requirements for filing a second or suc-
cessive motion, it shall proceed to consider the merits of the 
motion, along with any defenses and arguments the respondent 
may raise. Any determination that the district court makes about 
whether [an applicant] has satisfied the requirements for filing 
a second or successive motion, and any determination it makes 
on the merits, if it reaches the merits, is subject to review on 
appeal from a final judgment or order if an appeal is filed. 
Should an appeal be filed from the district court’s determina-
tion, nothing in this order shall bind the merits panel in that ap-
peal. 
Id. 
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force.”65 No other court of appeals did that.66 And, as one judge ob-
served, much of this occurred outside public view.67 The tension re-
garding the application of the ACCA’s elements clause after John-
son II, however, was not limited to the post-conviction context. With 
the residual clause gone, a critical question remained—what of-
fenses continue to qualify as ACCA predicates? The answer turns, 
in large part, on what acts qualify as violent “physical force” under 
Johnson I. 
                                                                                                             
 65 See In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x at 771–72 (Martin, J., concurring) (“[I]n 
reviewing those applications we have been doing more than what the statute di-
rects. The judges of this court, myself included, have been combing through 
sealed records from the prisoner’s original sentence hearing to speculate about 
whether the prisoner would win if we let him file in district court.”); see also In 
re McCall, 826 F.3d at 1311 (Martin, J., concurring); In re Jones, 830 F.3d at 
1302 (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring) (“We know that some applications 
erroneously were denied, although we do not know how many.”). This practice of 
deciding merits issues in published SOS orders raised questions within the Elev-
enth Circuit about whether such orders are binding outside the unique SOS con-
text. Compare In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To be clear, 
our prior-panel-precedent rule applies with equal force as to prior panel decisions 
published in the context of applications to file second or successive peti-
tions.”), with United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1350 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(Martin, J., concurring) (“It is neither wise nor just for this type of limited ruling, 
resulting from such a confined process, to bind every judge on this court as we 
consider fully counseled and briefed issues in making merits decisions that may 
result in people serving decades or lives in prison.”). Recently, however, the Elev-
enth Circuit resolved that issue by holding published SOS orders are binding on 
direct appeal. United States v. St. Hubert, 883 F.3d 1319, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 
2018). 
 66 See In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301, 310 n.13 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing In re Grif-
fin, 823 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2016)) (“[W]e do not follow the Eleventh 
Circuit, which—contrary to our precedent—resolved a merits question in the con-
text of a motion to authorize a second or successive habeas petition.”); In re 
McCall, 826 F.3d at 1312 (Martin, J., concurring) (“[T]his effort sets our court 
apart . . . . other courts are not scrutinizing the merits of these cases at this stage.”); 
Id. at 1312 n.7 (“I am aware of no order from another court of appeals that combs 
through an applicant’s presentence investigation report to decide the merits of his 
yet-unfiled motion without ever hearing from a lawyer. And our court has done 
this in hundreds of cases.”). 
 67 See In re McCall, 826 F.3d at 1312 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Our court’s 
massive effort to decide the merits of hundreds of habeas cases within 30 days 
each, all over a span of just a few weeks, has been largely hidden from public 
view. Very few of our orders in these cases are reported or posted on the court’s 
website, which means no lawyer is likely to see them.”). 
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IV. FLORIDA ROBBERY & THE ELEMENTS CLAUSE 
In Johnson I, the Supreme Court observed that the term “physi-
cal force” suggests a “substantial degree of force.”68 However, be-
fore Johnson II, most offenses fell within the broad sweep of the 
residual clause, so courts could avoid engaging in elements clause 
analyses.69 But after Johnson II, the elements clause has become the 
default home for many offenses under the ACCA.70 So the following 
question is more important than ever—what is a “substantial degree 
of force”? 
In Welch, the Supreme Court left open whether a Florida con-
viction for robbery qualifies as a “violent felony” under the elements 
clause.71 Since then, the issue has not only placed the Eleventh and 
Ninth Circuits at odds, but, broadly speaking, created tension among 
the circuits about the amount of force required.72 
A. The Florida Robbery Statute 
Florida’s robbery statute, Fla. Stat. § 812.13, defines robbery as:  
[T]he taking of money or other property which may be 
the subject of larceny from the person or custody of 
another, with intent to either permanently or temporar-
ily deprive the person or the owner of the money or 
other property, when in the course of the taking there 
is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in 
fear.73 
 
                                                                                                             
 68 Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (“Even by itself, the word ‘violent’ in 
§ 924(e)(2)(B) connotes a substantial degree of force.”). 
 69 See infra Part IV.B. 
 70 See generally Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Welch v. United States, 
136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). 
 71 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268. 
 72 Compare United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 2016), with 
United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 900 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 73 § 812.13(1), FLA. STAT. (2017) (emphasis added). The Florida robbery 
statute, which was enacted in 1868, has always had a “force” element. The most 
recent amendment to the statute was in 1992, when the legislature “add[ed] this 
language: ‘with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or 
the owner of the money or other property.’” United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 
1326, 1339 n.6 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). 
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The various degrees of robbery, unchanged since 1974, depend on 
whether the perpetrator “carried” a firearm, deadly weapon, 
weapon, or no weapon.74 A firearm or weapon that is “carried” by 
the perpetrator, though, need not have been “used” in the robbery. 
In fact, the victim need not even be aware of the firearm or 
weapon.75 
B. The Pre-Johnson II Cases—Dowd, Lockley, and Welch 
In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit issued United States v. Dowd, the 
first case to address whether a Florida conviction for armed robbery 
qualified as a “violent felony.”76 In a single sentence, the Court rea-
soned “without difficulty” that “Dowd’s January 17, 1974, armed 
robbery conviction is undeniably a conviction for a violent felony 
[under the ACCA’s elements clause].”77 Dowd, however, was issued 
before Johnson I, and, for that matter, any of the recent Supreme 
Court cases clarifying the application of the categorical approach.78 
                                                                                                             
 74 § 812.13(2)(a)–(c), FLA. STAT. 
 75 See State v. Baker, 452 So. 2d 927, 929 (Fla. 1984) (“[T]he statutory ele-
ment which enhances punishment for armed robbery is not the use of the deadly 
weapon, but the mere fact that a deadly weapon was carried by the perpetrator. 
The victim may never even be aware that a robber is armed, so long as the perpe-
trator has the weapon in his possession during the offense.”); State v. Burris, 875 
So. 2d 408, 413 (Fla. 2004) (“In Baker, we recognized the distinction between 
carrying a deadly weapon and using a deadly weapon”). “The offense of robbery 
while armed contains, in addition to its other constituent statutory elements, the 
element that the accused carried a firearm or other deadly weapon. The elements 
of the crime do not include displaying the weapon or using it in perpetrating the 
robbery.” Williams v. State, 560 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see also 
United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 871 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
(“Our precedents apply to Florida robbery as well as armed robbery because the 
elements are identical, differing only in what ‘the offender carried’ ‘in the course 
of committing the robbery.’) (citing § 812.13, FLA. STAT. (2017)). 
 76 United States v. Dowd, 451 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 77 Id. 
 78 “Dowd did not conduct the required categorical analysis.” Seabrooks, 839 
F.3d at 1348 (Martin, J., concurring). 
Nowhere did the Dowd opinion: (1) consult state law to identify 
the least culpable conduct for which an armed robbery convic-
tion could be sustained; (2) analyze whether that least culpable 
conduct was encompassed by the generic federal offense; or (3) 
discuss whether the Florida armed robbery statute was divisible. 
It only stated the conclusion (again, in one sentence) that a 1974 
Florida armed robbery conviction counts as a violent felony. 
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Considering Dowd was issued before Johnson I, there was a legiti-
mate question about whether Dowd remained binding precedent.79 
During the summer of SOS orders, the court relied on Dowd in 
at least three published orders to deny authorization to applicants 
with prior Florida convictions for armed robbery.80 At the same 
time, however, authorization was granted for individuals with Flor-
ida convictions for unarmed robbery before 199781 and for at-
tempted armed robbery.82 The issue came to a head in United States 
v. Seabrooks and United States v. Fritts,83 but before turning to those 
decisions, it is necessary to first discuss the Eleventh Circuit’s other 
pre-Johnson II robbery decisions. 
The Eleventh Circuit addressed Florida robbery for the first time 
after Johnson I in United States v. Lockley.84 In Lockley, the court 
considered whether a 2001 Florida conviction for attempted robbery 
qualified as a “crime of violence” under USSG § 4B1.2, the federal 
sentencing guideline for career offenders.85 Applying the categori-
cal approach, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the least culpable 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
 79 Compare id. at 1339, 1341 (majority opinion) (“My view is that Dowd and 
its progeny control under our prior panel precedent rule,”), with id. at 1346 (Bad-
lock, J., concurring) (“I would . . . leave for another day the question of the con-
tinuing viability of Dowd.”), and id. at 1348 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Dowd is 
no longer good law.”). 
 80 In re Hires, 825 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016) (referencing Dowd and 
holding that the defendant’s 1995 Florida robbery conviction qualified as a “vio-
lent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause); In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345, 
1349 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Dowd and holding that the defendant’s 1980 and 
1986 Florida “convictions for armed robbery qualify as ACCA predicates under 
the elements clause”); In re Moore, 830 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2016) (con-
cluding that the defendant’s two Florida robbery-with-a-firearm convictions and 
his armed robbery conviction “qualify as violent felonies under our binding prec-
edent” in Dowd and Thomas). 
 81 E.g., In re Pace, No. 16-11898, slip op. at 3–5 (11th Cir. May 16, 2016); 
In re Jackson, 826 F.3d 1343, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2016). Prior to 1997, Florida 
courts were divided on whether sudden snatchings were robberies. Robinson v. 
State, 692 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1997). 
 82 E.g., In re Lampley, No. 16-12465, slip op. at 4–6 (11th Cir. June 15, 
2016); In re James, No. 16-12548, slip op. at 4–5 (11th Cir. June 8, 2016). 
 83 See infra Part IV.C. 
 84 United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 85 Id. at 1240, 1240 n.1 (stating Lockley had a 2001 Florida conviction for 
attempted robbery); see United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1359 (11th 
Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., concurring) (“Lockley considered whether a 2001 Florida 
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act under the robbery statute was taking an individual’s money or 
property by placing him in fear of death or great bodily harm.86 The 
court found it “inconceivable” that this type of conduct “would not 
involve the use or threatened use of physical force.”87 Because the 
guidelines’ commentary stated that “the attempt to commit a ‘crime 
of violence’ is itself a ‘crime of violence,’” the Eleventh Circuit 
found that Mr. Lockley’s conviction for attempted robbery qualified 
as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause.88 The court al-
ternatively concluded that Mr. Lockley’s conviction also qualified 
under both the residual clause and the guidelines’ commentary, 
which enumerated robbery as a “crime of violence.”89 Notably, 
                                                                                                             
attempted robbery conviction under § 812.13(1) counts as a ‘crime of violence’ 
within the meaning of the identically-worded elements clause of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”). At that time, the definition of a “violent felony” under the ACCA 
and a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines were substantially 
similar. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2011), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012). Moreover, 
the definitions had identical elements clauses and residual clauses. Compare U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2011), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit considered 
cases interpreting the language in one definition as authoritative in cases inter-
preting the language in the other. Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1243 n.5 (“Though 
ACCA’s ‘violent felony’ enhancement and the Guidelines’ career offender en-
hancement differ slightly in their wording, we apply the same analysis to both.”). 
 86 Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1244–45. 
 87 Id. at 1245. 
 88 Id. The ACCA has no such commentary, so whether an attempted robbery 
qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA requires the court to determine 
whether the least culpable act for committing an attempted robbery has as an ele-
ment the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” See United 
States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 941–42 n.6 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omit-
ted). However, even under that analysis, the Eleventh Circuit concluded attempted 
robbery qualifies as a “violent felony” under the elements clause. United States v. 
Joyner, 882 F.3d 1369, 1378–79 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 89 Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1241–46; In re Jackson, 826 F.3d 1343, 1347 n.2 (11th 
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he bulk of Lockley’s analysis (at least 13 paragraphs of the opin-
ion) focused on the argument that ‘Lockley’s prior attempted robbery conviction 
qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’ because robbery is an enumerated offense’ in 
§ 4B1.2’s application note.”). In 2016, robbery was removed from the commen-
tary and added to the enumerated-offenses clause. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL app. C amt. 798 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
1150 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1130 
 
Lockley did not rely on Dowd, arguably suggesting that Dowd was 
no longer good law in light of Johnson I.90 
A year after Lockley, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a 
1996 Florida conviction for robbery qualified as a “violent felony” 
under the ACCA in United States v. Welch.91 In Welch, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that this conviction qualified as a “violent felony” under 
the ACCA’s residual clause.92  The court, however, declined to ad-
dress whether such a conviction qualified under the elements 
clause.93 The year in which Welch’s offense occurred—before or 
after 1997—was critical to the court’s analysis94 because Florida 
law relating to robbery qualitatively changed in 1997.95 
The Welch court explained that in 1976, the Florida Supreme 
Court stated, “[a]ny degree of force suffices to convert larceny into 
a robbery.”96 Thereafter, “the state courts of appeal were divided on 
whether a snatching, as of a purse, or cash from a person’s hand, or 
jewelry on the person’s body, amounted to robbery.”97 Then, in 
1997, the Florida Supreme Court decided Robinson v. State, holding 
that “for the snatching of property from another to amount to rob-
bery, the perpetrator must employ more than the force necessary to 
remove the property from the person. Rather, there must be re-
sistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical force of the 
                                                                                                             
 90 During the summer of SOS orders, however, the Eleventh Circuit relied on 
Lockley’s elements clause holding at least once. See In re Robinson, 822 F.3d 
1196, 1197 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Lockley and concluding that the defendant’s 
1991 Florida conviction for armed robbery has “as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against” another person). 
 91 United States v. Welch, 683 F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2012). This same 
defendant would go on to prevail in the Supreme Court on whether Johnson II is 
retroactive to cases on collateral review. See supra Part III. 
 92 Welch, 683 F.3d at 1312–13. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 1311–12. 
 95 Id. at 1311, 1311 n.31 (discussing Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886 
(Fla. 1997)). 
 96 Id. at 1311; McCloud, 335 So. 2d at 258. 
 97 Welch, 683 F.3d at 1311. 
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offender.”98 After Robinson, Fla. Stat. § 812.131 was enacted to pe-
nalize robbery by sudden snatching.99 Thus, before Robinson, “sud-
den snatchings” were prosecuted as robberies by “force.”100 
Accordingly, the Welch court assumed for purposes of its ACCA 
analysis that Mr. Welch pled guilty to robbery “at a time when mere 
snatching sufficed.”101 The Welch court discussed Lockley, but 
stated, “Lockley does not reach the question of whether robbery by 
sudden snatching would or would not present ‘a serious risk of phys-
ical injury to another’ under the residual clause[.]”102 As for the el-
ements clause, the court wrote: 
[U]nder [Johnson I], “physical force” means not 
merely what “force” means in physics, but “violent 
force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain 
or injury to another person.” That Johnson [I] discus-
sion was in the context of the elements clause re-
quirement of “physical force,” not the residual clause 
requirement of “serious risk of potential injury to an-
other.” Arguably the elements clause would not ap-
ply to mere snatching, but the issue is not cut and 
dried. We need not decide whether snatching is suf-
ficiently violent under the elements clause, though, 
because it suffices under the residual clause.103 
Once Johnson II invalidated the residual clause, the Eleventh 
Circuit was confronted with the question left open in Welch: whether 
a pre-1997 robbery conviction qualified as a “violent felony” under 
the elements clause.104 
C. The Johnson II Aftermath—Seabrooks & Fritts 
In United States v. Seabrooks, the court seemingly had the op-
portunity to address the question left open in Welch: whether a pre-
1997 Florida armed robbery conviction qualified under the elements 
                                                                                                             
 98 Robinson, 692 So. 2d at 886. 
 99 Welch, 683 F.3d at 1311 n.30 (citing § 812.131, FLA. STAT. (2000)). 
 100 Id. at 1311–12. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 1312. 
 103 Id. at 1312–13. 
 104 Id. at 1313. 
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clause.105 Ultimately, however, the court was unable to address this 
question because Mr. Seabrooks’ conviction was imposed four 
months after the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson, and 
was therefore governed by Lockley.106 The court, nevertheless, is-
sued deeply divided dicta about the continuing validity of Dowd and 
whether there was truly a distinction between pre-1997 and post-
1997 robberies.107 
Judge Hull, on the one hand, believed Dowd remained binding 
precedent, which was confirmed by the SOS decisions relying on 
Dowd.108 She also believed that anything Welch said about the ele-
ments clause was not only dicta “but wrong dicta” because Robinson 
was stating “what the statute always meant.”109 Therefore, according 
to Judge Hull, there was no distinction between pre-1997 and post-
1997 robberies.110 In her view, robberies committed through the use 
of “force,” no matter when they occurred, had always required 
enough force to overcome a victim’s resistance.111 And based on 
Lockley and Dowd, that type of robbery qualified as a “violent fel-
ony” under the elements clause.112 
                                                                                                             
 105 United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1338 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 106 Id. at 1341 (“Seabrooks’ armed robbery convictions qualify as ACAA-
violent felonies under Lockley.”); see also id. at 1346 (Baldock, J., concurring) 
(“All members of the panel agree that [Lockley] answers in the affirmative the 
question of whether Defendant qualifies as an armed career criminal for federal 
sentencing purposes.”); id. (Martin, J., concurring) (“[T]his panel opinion stands 
only for the rule that our Circuit precedent in [Lockley] requires Mr. Seabrooks’s 
1997 Florida convictions for armed robbery to be counted in support of his 2015 
Armed Career Criminal Act (‘ACCA’) sentence.”). 
 107 Compare id. at 1339, 1341 (“My view is that Dowd and its progeny control 
under our prior panel precedent rule.”), with id. at 1346 (Badlock, J., concurring) 
(“I would . . . leave for another day the question of the continuing viability of 
Dowd.”), and id. at 1348 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Dowd is no longer good law.”). 
 108 Id. at 1339–40 (“My view is that Dowd and its progeny control under our 
prior panel precedent rule . . . .”); see also id. at 1341–43 (stating that neither 
Johnson I, Descamps, nor Mathis abrogated Dowd); id. at 1348 n.1 (Martin, J., 
concurring) (“In her discussion of Dowd, Judge Hull writes for herself.”). 
 109 Id. at 1344–45 (citing Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–
13 (1994)). 
 110 See id. at 1344. 
 111 Id. at 1343–45. 
 112 Id. at 1341 (“Dowd and Lockley control the outcome of this case.”). 
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Judge Martin, on the other hand, believed Dowd’s holding had 
been abrogated “in light of the clarifications given to us by the Su-
preme Court about what steps we must take when applying the cat-
egorical approach.”113 Nowhere in Dowd, Judge Martin stated, did 
the court: “(1) consult state law to identify the least culpable conduct 
for which an armed robbery conviction could be sustained; (2) ana-
lyze whether that least culpable conduct was encompassed by the 
generic federal offense; or (3) discuss whether the Florida armed 
robbery statute was divisible.”114 In Judge Martin’s view, the Su-
preme Court’s instructions to undertake these steps undermined 
Dowd’s “conclusory mode of analysis ‘to the point of abroga-
tion.’”115 
Judge Martin also opined that the court’s recent reliance on 
Dowd in published SOS orders was of no moment given the unique 
context in which SOS orders are entered.116 She reasoned: 
It is neither wise nor just for this type of limited rul-
ing, resulting from such a confined process, to bind 
every judge on this court as we consider fully coun-
seled and briefed issues in making merits decisions 
that may result in people serving decades or lives in 
prison. The fact that some of this court’s limited rul-
ings on these applications referenced Dowd should 
have no bearing on our merits decision here. Dowd 
has been abrogated and no longer binds us on the 
merits.117 
                                                                                                             
 113 Id. at 1348 (Martin, J., concurring); see id. (“Dowd did not conduct the 
required categorical analysis. The entirety of Dowd’s reasoning occupies one sen-
tence: ‘Dowd’s January 17, 1974, armed robbery conviction is undeniably a con-
viction for a violent felony [under the ACCA’s elements clause].’ Dowd’s reason-
ing was not sufficient to support its holding.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1349 (citing United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 
2008)). 
 116 Id. at 1350; see supra Part III.B. (discussing the unique context in which 
SOS orders are issued). However, the Eleventh Circuit has since held such orders 
are binding on direct appeal. United States v. St. Hubert, 883 F.3d 1319, 1328–29 
(11th Cir. 2018). 
 117 Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1350 (Martin, J., concurring). 
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As for the distinction between pre-1997 and post-1997 rob-
beries, Judge Martin agreed with Judge Hull insofar as Robinson 
stated that the interpretation of a statute is generally a statement 
about “what the statute has always meant.”118 But to Judge Martin, 
the question was not what the statute meant at the time of Mr. Sea-
brooks’ conviction.119 Instead, she believed the question was “what 
conduct could have resulted in Mr. Seabrooks’s 1997 convictions 
under the statute, even if Florida courts were misinterpreting the 
statute at that time.”120 
Before the April 1997 decision in Robinson, the governing deci-
sion was the Florida Supreme Court’s June 1976 opinion in 
McCloud v. State, which “held that a defendant who ‘exert[ed] phys-
ical force to extract [a handbag] from [the victim’s] grasp’ had com-
mitted robbery because ‘any degree of force suffices to convert lar-
ceny into a robbery.’”121 Thus, in Judge Martin’s view, between 
June 1976 and April 1997, the least culpable act under the Florida 
robbery statute was a sudden snatching,122 and both the Supreme 
Court’s directives and the Eleventh Circuit’s mode of analysis in 
Welch required that result.123 Judge Martin went on to conclude that 
                                                                                                             
 118 Id. at 1351 n.5. 
 119 Id. (“But here our interest is not about divining the true meaning of 
§ 812.13.”). 
 120 Id.; accord id. at 1351 (citing McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816, 820 
(2011) (internal quotations omitted)). Courts are still grappling with whether state 
decisions issued after the defendant’s state conviction was imposed should be re-
lied on when “determining the content of state law . . . .” United States v. Geozos, 
870 F.3d 890, 899 n.8 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 121 Id. at 1351 (quoting McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258–59 (Fla. 
1976)). 
 122 Id. To explain her view, Judge Martin states the following: 
That means that people convicted under § 812.13 af-
ter McCloud in 1976 (but before Robinson in 1997) could have 
had their convictions sustained under the statute when they 
merely used “any degree of force.” The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
instruction to us in McNeill does not allow us to ignore this in-
terpretation by the Florida Supreme Court. 
Id.; see also United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(Martin, J., concurring) (“[T]he year of conviction matters because the least cul-
pable conduct sufficient to support a robbery conviction under Fla. Stat. § 812.13 
changed in 1997.”). 
 123 See Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1352 (Martin, J., concurring) (stating that 
Welch “binds us whenever we apply the categorical approach to analyze a Florida 
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a sudden snatching did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the 
elements clause.124 At the end of the day though, despite their disa-
greements, everyone agreed Mr. Seabrooks’ case was governed by 
Lockley, so Judge Hull’s and Judge Martin’s dueling dicta was ulti-
mately just that—dicta.125 
Three weeks later, without holding oral argument, Judge Hull 
made her side of the story binding precedent in United States v. 
Fritts.  In Fritts, the court held that under Dowd and Lockley, a 1989 
Florida conviction for armed robbery qualified as a “violent felony” 
under the elements clause.126 As a result, all Florida convictions for 
robbery, regardless of when they occurred, qualify as “violent 
felon[ies]” under the ACCA’s elements clause.127 
                                                                                                             
robbery conviction from a time before the Florida Supreme court decided Robin-
son.”). 
 124 See Stokeling, 684 F. App’x at 874 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Sudden 
snatching with ‘any degree of force,’ plainly does not require the use of ‘a sub-
stantial degree of force.’ Neither does it necessarily entail ‘violent force—that is, 
force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.’”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 125 See United States v. Birge, 830 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010)) (“As we have ex-
plained time and again: ‘[A] decision can hold nothing beyond the facts of that 
case.’”). Judge Martin stated: 
Judge Hull’s remark that the elements of § 812.13 have not 
changed since the 1970s is not necessary to our decision to af-
firm Mr. Seabrooks’s sentence. Mr. Seabrooks was convicted 
after the Florida Supreme Court decided Robinson, so his 
§ 812.13 conviction required more than sudden snatching. As a 
result, we are bound by Lockley and must affirm Mr. Sea-
brooks’s enhanced sentence under the ACCA. I analyze Mr. 
Seabrooks’s case in a different way than does Judge Hull, but I 
agree that his conviction and sentence must be affirmed. 
Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1352 (Martin, J., concurring). 
 126 United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 940 n.3 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We 
acknowledge that this opinion uses the discussion in . . . Seabrooks. Given that 
these sections were a single judge concurrence, we now use that same analysis as 
the panel opinion here.”); id. at 943–44 (“In sum, based on our precedent 
in Dowd and Lockley, and in light of the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Robinson, McCloud, and Montsdoca, we conclude that Fritts’s Florida armed 
robbery conviction under § 812.13 categorically qualifies as a ‘violent felony’ 
under the ACCA’s elements clause.”). 
 127 The Eleventh Circuit continues to affirm ACCA sentences predicated on 
Florida robberies based on Fritts. See Stokeling, 684 F. App’x at 871; United 
States v. Conde, 686 F. App’x 755, 757 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Burke, 
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Since Fritts, the Eleventh Circuit has not only declined to rehear 
the issue en banc, where it could reconsider the issue unencumbered 
by the weight of prior panel precedent,128 but has granted motions 
for summary affirmance, disposing of appeals without issuing even 
an unpublished opinion.129 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has made it 
undeniably clear that it will not reconsider whether Florida robbery 
is a “violent felony.” Right or wrong, this has “enormous conse-
quences for many criminal defendants who come before [the] 
[c]ourt.”130 
D. Overcoming Resistance Does Not Require Violent 
“Physical Force” 
One critical point of contention between Judge Hull and Judge 
Martin is whether the standard set forth by the Florida Supreme 
Court in Robinson—force sufficient to overcome resistance—gov-
erns when evaluating the least culpable act for robbery convictions 
imposed between June 1976 and April 1997.131 However, in Sea-
brooks, both agreed that after April 1997, the least culpable act is 
placing a victim in fear, which qualifies under the elements 
clause.132 The truth is, they are both wrong about post-1997 rob-
beries. Even if force sufficient to overcome resistance has always 
                                                                                                             
863 F.3d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Everette, 694 F. App’x 
760, 760–61 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 128 United States v. Everette, No. 16-11147, slip op. at 2 (11th Cir. July 31, 
2017). 
 129 Hardy v. United States, No. 17-11275, slip op. at 3 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 
2017) (finding summary affirmance appropriate based on Fritts). 
 130 Stokeling, 684 F. App’x at 876 (Martin, J., concurring). 
 131 Compare United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1344 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Montsdoca v. State, 93 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1922)) (“[S]ince 1922, the 
Florida Supreme Court has held that ‘the force that is required to make the offense 
of a robbery is such force as is actually sufficient to overcome the victim’s re-
sistance.’”), with id. at 1351 (Martin, J., concurring) (“[P]eople convicted under 
§ 812.13 after McCloud in 1976 (but before Robinson in 1997) could have had 
their convictions sustained under the statute when they merely use ‘any degree of 
force.’”). 
 132 Id. at 1340–41; id. at 1350 (Martin, J., concurring); see Stokeling, 684 F. 
App’x at 875 (Martin, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 
1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 2011)) (“[T]he Lockley court correctly identified ‘putting 
in fear’—and not sudden snatching—as the least culpable conduct in its categor-
ical analysis of Mr. Lockley’s 2001 attempted robbery conviction.”). 
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been the standard, committing a robbery by “force” is still the least 
culpable act under the robbery statute because using such force does 
not categorically require the use of “a substantial degree of force.”133 
Therefore, a Florida conviction for robbery never qualifies as a “vi-
olent felony.”134 
Under Robinson, a robbery occurs when a victim resists and the 
defendant uses enough force to overcome that resistance.135 Thus, if 
a victim’s resistance is minimal, the force needed to overcome that 
resistance is also minimal. Indeed, Florida caselaw is clear that a 
defendant may be convicted of robbery even if he uses only a mini-
mal amount of force.136 A conviction may be imposed if a defendant: 
(1) bumps someone from behind;137 (2) engages in a tug-of-war over 
                                                                                                             
 133 Recently, one Eleventh Circuit judge also concluded that overcoming re-
sistance does not require the use of “physical force.” United States v. Lee, 886 
F.3d 1161, 1169–71 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
 134 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012); Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 
The Florida robbery statute is indivisible regarding whether a taking was accom-
plished “by force, violence, assault or putting in fear” because these alternatives 
are simply different means by which a single element may be satisfied. See Mathis 
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249, 2256–57 (2016). A jury is not “required” 
to find one of several alternative options beyond a reasonable doubt. United States 
v. Lockett, 810 F.3d 1262, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2016). Therefore, it must be pre-
sumed that all robbery convictions are based on the least culpable conduct re-
quired under the statute. See Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1340–41 (citing Lockley, 632 
F.3d at 1244–45); United States v. Braun, 801 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013)) (“We must presume 
that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminal-
ized . . . .”). And as explained here, that is a robbery “by force.” 
 135 Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997) (“[I]n order for the 
snatching of property from another to amount to robbery, the perpetrator must 
employ more than the force necessary to remove the property from the person. 
Rather, there must be resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical 
force of the offender.”). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Hayes v. State, 780 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). 
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a purse;138 (3) pushes someone;139 (4) shakes someone;140 (5) strug-
gles to escape someone’s grasp;141 (6) peels back someone’s fin-
gers;142 or (7) pulls a scab off someone’s finger.143 Indeed, under 
Florida law, a robbery conviction may be upheld based on “ever so 
little” force.144 
The Ninth Circuit recently recognized this when it held that a 
Florida conviction for robbery, regardless of whether it is armed or 
unarmed, fails to satisfy the elements clause.145 In so holding, the 
Ninth Circuit relied on Florida caselaw clarifying that an individual 
                                                                                                             
 138 Benitez-Saldana v. State, 67 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). 
 139 Rumph v. State, 544 So. 2d 1150, 1151–52 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). 
 140 Montsdoca v. State, 93 So. 157, 159–160 (Fla. 1922). 
 141 Colby v. State, 35 So. 189, 190 (Fla. 1903). In Colby, the defendant was 
caught during an attempted pickpocketing. Id. The victim grabbed the defendant’s 
arm, and the defendant struggled to escape. Id. Under the robbery statute in effect 
at the time, the Florida Supreme Court held it was not a robbery because the force 
was used to escape, rather than secure the money. Id. However, the Florida Su-
preme Court has made clear that this conduct would have qualified as a robbery 
under the current robbery statute. See Robinson, 692 So. 2d at 887 n.10 (“Alt-
hough the crime in Colby was held to be larceny, it would be robbery under the 
current version of the robbery statute because the perpetrator used force to escape 
the victim’s grasp.”). Indeed, Florida courts have made clear that if a pickpocket 
“jostles the owner, or if the owner, catching the pickpocket in the act, struggles 
unsuccessfully to keep possession,” a robbery has been committed. Rigell v. State, 
782 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN 
W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 781 (2d ed. 1986)); Fine v. State, 758 So. 2d 1246, 
1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, JR., supra, at 781). 
 142 Sanders v. State, 769 So. 2d 506, 507–08 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). 
 143 Johnson v. State, 612 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). 
 144 Santiago v. State, 497 So. 2d 975, 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In Santiago, 
the defendant reached into a car and pulled two gold necklaces from around the 
victim’s neck, causing a few scratch marks and some redness around her neck. Id. 
 145 United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2017). The Geozos 
Court correctly stated that whether a robbery was armed or unarmed made no 
difference because an individual may be convicted of armed robbery for “merely 
carrying a firearm” during the robbery, even if the firearm is not displayed and 
the victim is unaware of its presence. Id. at 897–901; see State v. Baker, 452 So. 
2d 927, 929 (Fla. 1984); State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 413 (Fla. 2004); Williams 
v. State, 560 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see also United States v. Par-
nell, 818 F.3d 974, 977, 980–81 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a Massachusetts 
conviction for armed robbery, which requires only the possession of a firearm 
(without using or even displaying it), does not qualify as a “violent felony” under 
the ACCA’s elements clause). 
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may violate Florida’s robbery statute without using violent force.146 
Although the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have both recognized that 
the Florida robbery statute requires an individual use enough force 
to overcome a victim’s resistance, the Ninth Circuit stated that it 
believed the Eleventh Circuit “overlooked the fact that, if resistance 
itself is minimal, then the force used to overcome that resistance is 
not necessarily violent force.”147 
The issue of whether force sufficient to overcome resistance cat-
egorically requires the use of violent force is not unique to Florida’s 
robbery statute. It affects robbery statutes throughout the nation. In 
fact, most states permit robbery convictions where the degree of 
force used is sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance. Indeed, at 
least fifteen states use some variation of this standard in the text of 
their statutes,148 and several others have adopted it through 
caselaw.149 Since Johnson II, several circuits have had to reevaluate 
whether these statutes and others still qualify as “violent felon[ies]” 
under the ACCA’s elements clause.150 And these courts have 
                                                                                                             
 146 Geozos, 870 F.3d at 900–01 (citing Benitez-Saldana v. State, 67 So. 3d 
320, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)). 
 147 Id. Indeed, in both Fritts and Seabrooks, the Eleventh Circuit failed to con-
sult any Florida caselaw about the amount of force required to satisfy the over-
coming resistance standard. See United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 942–44 
(11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1344 (11th Cir. 
2016). 
 148 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1901, 1902 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
133(1) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 609.24 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.395(1)(a) 
(2017); WIS. STAT. § 943.32(1)(a) (2017); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.510(a)(1) 
(2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 831(a)(1) (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-
841(1)(a) (2016); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 570.010(13), 570.025(1) (2016); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9A.56.190 (2016); ALA. CODE § 13A-8-43(a)(1) (2015); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 200.380(1)(b) (2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 791, 792, 793 (2011); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.00(1) (McKinney 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 
§ 651(1)(B)(1) (2006). 
 149 See, e.g., West v. State, 539 A.2d 231, 234 (Md. 1988); State v. Blunt, 193 
N.W.2d 434, 435 (Neb. 1972); State v. Sein, 590 A.2d 665, 668 (N.J. 1991); State 
v. Curley, 939 P.2d 1103, 1105 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Robertson, 740 
A.2d 330, 334 (R.I. 1999); State v. Stecker, 108 N.W.2d 47, 50 (S.D. 1961); Lane 
v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Winn v. Commonwealth, 
462 S.E.2d 911, 913 (Va. Ct. App. 1995). 
 150 See United States v. Swopes, 886 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc); 
United States v. Walton, 881 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2018); In re Welch, 884 F.3d 
1319 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Jones, 877 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260, 1262 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. 
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reached differing conclusions. As a result, significant tension has 
arisen about the degree of force a state robbery statute must require 
to satisfy the elements clause.151 The Fourth Circuit’s decisions in 
United States v. Gardner and United States v. Winston are instruc-
tive in this regard.152 
In Winston, the Fourth Circuit held that a Virginia conviction for 
common law robbery committed by “violence” does not categori-
cally require the use of “physical force.”153 Such a robbery is com-
mitted when a defendant employs “anything which calls out re-
sistance.”154 A conviction may be imposed even if a defendant does 
not “actual[ly] harm” the victim.155 Rejecting the government’s ar-
gument that overcoming resistance satisfies the elements clause. the 
Fourth Circuit held that the minimal force required under Virginia 
law does not rise to the level of violent “physical force.”156 
In Gardner, the Fourth Circuit held that a North Carolina con-
viction for common law robbery does not qualify as a “violent fel-
ony” under the elements clause because it does not categorically re-
quire the use of “physical force.”157 A North Carolina common law 
robbery may be committed by force so long as the force “is suffi-
cient to compel a victim to part with his property.”158 “This defini-
tion,” the Fourth Circuit stated, “suggests that even de minimis con-
                                                                                                             
Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 308, 308 n.2 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Duncan, 833 
F.3d 751, 753–55 (7th Cir. 2016); Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1338; United States v. 
Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 801–02 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 
633, 640 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974, 977–78 (9th Cir. 
2016); United States v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193, 1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 683 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 151 See Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (defining “physical force” as “vi-
olent force . . . force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another per-
son.”). 
 152 See Gardner, 823 F.3d at 804 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Winston, 
850 F.3d 677, 683–84 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 153 Winston, 850 F.3d at 683–86. 
 154 Id. at 684–85 (quoting Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 183 S.E. 452, 454 (Va. 
1936)). 
 155 Id. at 685 (quoting Henderson v. Commonwealth, No. 3017-99-1, 2000 
WL 1808487, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2000)). 
 156 Id. at 683–86. 
 157 Gardner, 823 F.3d at 803–04. 
 158 Id. at 803 (quoting State v. Sawyer, 29 S.E.2d 34, 37 (N.C. 1944)). 
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tact can constitute the ‘violence’ necessary for a common law rob-
bery conviction under North Carolina law.”159 The Fourth Circuit 
then discussed two North Carolina state cases that supported its con-
clusion.160 Based on these decisions, the Fourth Circuit held that 
“the minimum conduct necessary to sustain a conviction for North 
Carolina common law robbery does not necessarily” require “phys-
ical force,” and therefore the offense does not categorically qualify 
as a “violent felony” under the elements clause.161 
Like the Virginia offense described in Winston and the North 
Carolina offense addressed in Gardner, a Florida robbery may be 
committed by force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance.162 
As the Fourth Circuit recognized, this definition suggests that so 
long as a victim’s resistance is slight, a defendant need only use 
minimal force to commit a robbery.163 And, as explained above, 
Florida caselaw confirms this point. 
During the writing of this Article, the issue came to a head in the 
Supreme Court.  Proving the point that this issue affects many indi-
viduals, sixteen different petitions simultaneously sought review of 
whether Florida robbery is a “violent felony” under the ACCA.164  
The Supreme Court granted one of those petitions — Stokeling v. 
                                                                                                             
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 803–04 (discussing State v. Chance, No. 07-1491, 2008 WL 
2415981, at *3–4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) and State v. Eldridge, No. 08-1219, 2009 
WL 1525333, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)). 
 161 Id. at 804. 
 162 See Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997). 
 163 Admittedly, the Fourth Circuit relied on Fritts in an unpublished opinion 
to hold that a Florida conviction for robbery qualifies as a “violent felony” under 
the elements clause. United States v. Orr, 685 F. App’x 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2017). 
The decision in Orr, however, was issued before the Ninth Circuit rendered its 
decision in Geozos. 
 164 Stokeling v. United States, No. 17-5554 (U.S. 2018); Conde v. United 
States, No. 17-5772 (U.S. 2018); Williams v. United States, 17-6026 (U.S. 2018); 
Everette v. United States, No. 17-6054 (U.S. 2018); Jones v. United States, 17-
6140 (U.S. 2018); James v. United States, 17-6271 (U.S. 2018); Middleton v. 
United States, No. 17-6276 (U.S. 2018); Reeves v. United States, No. 17-6357 
(U.S. 2018); Rivera v. United States, No. 17-6374 (U.S. 2018); Shotwell v. United 
States, No. 17-6540 (U.S. 2018); Orr v. United States, No. 17-6577 (U.S. 2018); 
Mays v. United States, No. 17-6664 (U.S. 2018); Hardy v. United States, No. 17-
6829 (U.S. 2018); Wright v. United States, No. 17-6887 (U.S. 2018); Baxter v. 
United States, 17-6991 (U.S. 2018); Pace v. United States, No. 17-7140 (U.S. 
2018). 
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United States — and is holding the rest pending that decision.165  
Stokeling is the first elements clause case the Supreme Court has 
taken since Johnson I and provides the Court a much-needed oppor-
tunity to reinforce what it said there — that “physical force” requires 
“a substantial degree of force.”166 At a minimum, it requires more 
than the minimal force needed.167 
V. FLORIDA FELONY BATTERY & THE ELEMENTS CLAUSE 
Like the Florida robbery issue, the issue of whether a Florida 
conviction for felony battery qualifies as a “violent felony” under 
the elements clause has fractured the Eleventh Circuit.168 The statute 
has precipitated a tug-of-war over the contours of Johnson I’s “phys-
ical force” definition. While one side calls for an exclusive focus on 
the defendant’s act, the other side calls for consideration of the result 
a defendant’s act has on a victim.169 A Florida felony battery can be 
committed through the same “touch” addressed in Johnson I, but 
with the additional element that the defendant’s action unintention-
ally causes a victim great bodily harm.170 Considering the Supreme 
Court has held a touch does not require “violent force,” reviewing 
the Florida felony battery statute would provide the Court with an 
ideal opportunity to end this tug-of-war. 
A. The Florida Felony Battery Statute 
Under Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1), a person commits felony battery 
if he: “(a) [a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another per-
son against the will of the other; and (b) [c]auses great bodily harm, 
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.”171 Felony bat-
tery was created to fill a gap between simple battery under Fla. Stat. 
                                                                                                             
 165 Stokeling v. United States, No. 17-5554, 2018 WL 1568030 (U.S. Apr. 2, 
2018). 
 166 Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 
 167 See United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1412 (2014) (“Minor uses 
of force may not constitute ‘violence’ in the generic sense.”). 
 168 See generally United States v. Vail-Bailon (Vail-Bailon II), 868 F.3d 1293 
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 169 See id. at 1303,1305. 
 170 § 784.041(1), FLA. STAT. (2017); see T.S. v. State, 965 So. 2d 1288, 1290 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2007). 
 171 § 784.041(1), FLA. STAT. (2017). 
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§ 784.03(1)(a) and aggravated battery under Fla. Stat. 
§ 784.045(1)(a).172 The “touching” elements in simple battery, fel-
ony battery, and aggravated battery are identical—“[a]ctually and 
intentionally touch[ing] . . . another person against the[ir] will.”173 
However, the three differ in their second elements. Simple battery 
does not have another element, while both felony battery and aggra-
vated battery require that a victim suffer “great bodily harm, perma-
nent disability, or permanent disfigurement.”174 The difference be-
tween the two is that aggravated battery requires that the defendant 
intend the injury; felony battery does not.175 Thus, the issue in 
United States v. Vail-Bailon and the following cases is whether a 
“touch” that unintentionally results in great bodily harm categori-
cally requires the use of “violent force.”176 
B. The Unpublished Decisions—Eugene, Crawford, and Eady 
Before Vail-Bailon, the Eleventh Circuit had issued three un-
published decisions addressing whether a Florida conviction for fel-
ony battery requires violent “physical force.”177 The first decision 
was United States v. Eugene, which was issued in 2011.178 In Eu-
gene, the court was called upon to determine whether felony battery 
qualified as a “crime of violence” under the federal sentencing 
guidelines.179 After discussing Johnson I and the elements of felony 
                                                                                                             
 172 See Jefferies v. State, 849 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). 
 173 §§ 784.03, 784.041, 784.045, FLA. STAT. (2017). 
 174 T.S., 965 So. 2d at 1290 (“The definition of felony battery recites the first 
prong of the battery definition and adds the element of causing great bodily harm, 
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.”). 
 175 Id. (“Aggravated battery can thus be seen as . . . felony battery with the 
added element of intentionally or knowingly causing the great bodily harm.”). 
 176 See generally Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 177 Unpublished decisions are not binding. 11TH CIR. R. 36-2. 
 178 United States v. Eugene, 423 F. App’x 908 (11th Cir. 2011). Mr. Eugene 
also appealed the determination that his Florida conviction for robbery qualified 
as a “crime of violence,” but because he only preserved the right to appeal the 
district court’s determination that his felony battery conviction qualified as a 
“crime of violence,” the Eleventh Circuit dismissed that part of his appeal. Id. at 
909–10. (“Eugene appeals from his sentence and asks that we determine whether 
his prior Florida felony convictions for battery and strong arm robbery are crimes 
of violence under the guidelines.”). 
 179 See id. at 909–11 (citing United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1253 
(11th Cir. 2010)) (“Because the definitions of ‘violent felony’ under ACCA and 
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battery, the Eleventh Circuit stated that all “touching[s]” under the 
statute are not only “capable of causing physical pain or injury to 
another person,” but must actually do so.180 Based on this alone, the 
court held that felony battery categorically requires the use of vio-
lent “physical force.”181 
The Eleventh Circuit would not address the issue again for three 
years, until 2014, when it decided United States v. Crawford.182 In 
Crawford, the court was asked to decide whether a felony battery 
conviction qualified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s ele-
ments clause.183 Giving short shrift to Mr. Crawford’s challenge, the 
Eleventh Circuit stated in a single sentence that “[t]his offense qual-
ifies as a violent felony under the Act because it ‘has as an element 
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
[another] person.’”184 Five months later, in United States v. Eady, 
the court conducted another cursory analysis of the issue, again 
holding that a Florida conviction for felony battery is a “violent fel-
ony” under the ACCA’s elements clause.185 The court would not 
address the issue again until Vail-Bailon. 
                                                                                                             
‘crime of violence’ under the sentencing guidelines are virtually identical, we con-
sider cases interpreting one as authority in cases interpreting the other.”). 
 180 Id. at 911 (internal citations omitted). 
 181 Id. 
 182 United States v. Crawford, 568 F. App’x 725 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 183 Id. at 728 (“Crawford argues that his prior conviction in Florida for felony 
battery does not qualify as a violent felony . . . .”). Although Crawford challenged 
only the district court’s finding about his felony battery conviction, he also had 
convictions for “the sale or delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of 
a school, the possession of cocaine, manslaughter with a firearm or deadly 
weapon, attempted armed robbery, and attempted robbery during a home inva-
sion.” Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 United States v. Eady, 591 F. App’x 711, 719 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[U]nlike 
convictions for simple felony battery where no injury is required, convictions un-
der § 784.041 require significant bodily harm, disability, or disfigurement. It is 
incorrect to say that a person can ‘actually and intentionally’ hit another per-
son and cause ‘great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigure-
ment’ without using ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury.’”). The 
court held Mr. Eady’s felony battery conviction also qualified as a “violent fel-
ony” under the ACCA’s residual clause. Id. at 719–20. 
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C. The Panel Decision in Vail-Bailon 
In September 2016, the issue of whether Florida felony battery 
requires violent “physical force” again came before the Eleventh 
Circuit in Vail-Bailon.186 This time, however, the panel issued a 
published decision, holding that felony battery is not a “crime of 
violence” under USSG § 2L1.2’s elements clause.187 
Writing for the majority, Judge Rosenbaum cautioned against 
“judg[ing] a book by its cover” when determining whether a crime 
with a name like “felony battery” qualifies as a “violent” crime.188 
Instead, “[h]eeding the Supreme Court’s warning,” the Vail-Bailon 
panel “carefully compared the elements of felony battery under 
Florida law to the ‘elements clause’ of § 2L1.2’s definition of ‘crime 
of violence.’”189 The panel presumed that the defendant violated the 
first prong of the statute through a touch.190 “Significantly,” the 
panel observed, “the Supreme Court has already held that Florida 
battery, when committed by actually and intentionally touching an-
other against his or her will, does not satisfy the ‘elements 
clause.’”191 The panel reiterated the Johnson I Court’s observation 
that because a touching can be satisfied by any intentional physical 
contact, it does not require “violent force.”192 That the felony battery 
                                                                                                             
 186 United States v. Vail-Bailon (Vail-Bailon I), 838 F.3d 1091, 1094 (11th 
Cir. 2016). 
 187 Id. at 1098. The Court noted that USSG § 2L1.2’s elements clause “is the 
same as the elements clauses of the ACCA and the career-offender guideline.” Id. 
at 1094. In determining whether a prior conviction is a “violent felony” under the 
ACCA’s elements clause, courts may rely on cases interpreting the elements 
clause under the Guidelines and vice versa. See id.; United States v. Chitwood, 
676 F.3d 971, 975 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 188 Vail-Bailon I, 838 F.3d at 1092–93 (“This case raises the question of 
whether the Florida crime of felony battery—a crime that, from its name, may 
sound like a crime of violence—actually satisfies the definition of ‘crime of vio-
lence’ under § 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines when it is committed by mere 
touching.”). 
 189 Id. at 1093. 
 190 Id. at 1094. Because the panel found that the felony battery statute is di-
visible, the modified categorical approach applied. Id. However, because no Shep-
ard documents established the alternative element under which the defendant was 
convicted—a touch or strike—the panel assumed he violated the first prong of the 
statute by the least culpable act, a touch. Id. 
 191 Id. at 1095 (discussing Johnson I, 559 U.S 133 (2010)) (emphasis added). 
 192 Id. 
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statute requires the touching to cause great bodily harm did not 
change that.193 
Conversely, the dissent argued that the resulting injury required 
for felony battery necessarily fulfilled Johnson I’s definition of 
“physical force” because it meant that the touching used force “ca-
pable of” causing physical injury.194 However, the majority criti-
cized the dissent’s reasoning as “unmoor[ing]” Johnson I’s “physi-
cal force” definition “from its context.” The majority noted that in 
support of that definition, the Johnson I Court cited the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s Flores decision,195 which explained that “physical force” 
means force “intended to cause bodily injury, or at a minimum likely 
to do so.”196 
                                                                                                             
 193 Id. at 1096. 
 194 Id. at 1100 (Siler, J., dissenting) (“To be found guilty of violating 
§ 784.041, the defendant must be more than capable of causing bodily injury since 
he must in fact cause ‘great bodily harm.’ . . . If something necessarily results 
from the touching, then the logic is that it had to have been capable of that result 
from the beginning.”). Judge Siler sits on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
was sitting on the panel by designation. Id. at 1092 n.*. 
 195 Id. at 1097 (citing Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2003)).  
Citations to circuit-court opinions such as Flores do not find 
their way into Supreme Court opinions by accident. The Su-
preme Court’s reliance on Flores must mean something. The 
dissent’s argument does not account at all for the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on Flores, which very clearly puts into context 
what the Supreme Court had in mind when it used the phrase 
on which the government relies. Ignoring the citation to Flores 
would deprive the Supreme Court’s discussion of the meaning 
of “physical,” and thus, “violent,” force of its intended conno-
tation—force that is “intended to cause bodily injury, or at a 
minimum likely to do so.”  
Id. 
 196 Id. at 1096. The dissent criticized the panel’s heavy reliance on Flores, 
arguing that they should solely rely on the “capability” wording in Johnson I. 
Instead of focusing on the language in Johnson [I], the majority 
pivots to Johnson [I]’s citation to Flores . . . . Why do we need 
to speculate about the definition of “physical force” when the 
Supreme Court provided one in Johnson [I]? The Supreme 
Court was aware of the mens rea language used in Flores and 
chose not to use it. Instead, the operative word is “capability”—
that is, the crime must be capable of causing physical injury. 
Id. at 1100 (Siler, J., dissenting). 
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Under the Flores definition, Mr. Vail-Bailon’s felony battery 
conviction did not categorically require the use of “physical force,” 
because the resulting injury was not a “likely” or “intended” result 
of the touch.197 First, “great bodily harm” is not necessarily “likely” 
to result from a touch.198 That a touch actually results in “great bod-
ily harm” did not “somehow change[] the character of the mere 
touching from an action that is not likely to result in bodily harm to 
one that is likely to result in bodily harm.”199 The panel noted that 
felony battery could be committed, for instance, by an offender who 
taps another person on the shoulder while that person stands near the 
top of stairs, causing the person to be startled and fall down the 
stairs.200 Thus, the results of a touching do not alter the nature of the 
touching.201 
Second, the resulting “great bodily harm” did not have to be “in-
tended.”202 That not only excluded the other prong of the Flores def-
inition, but also implicated the Supreme Court’s decision in Leocal 
v. Ashcroft, which held that the phrase “use . . . of physical force” in 
the elements clause suggests “a higher degree of intent than negli-
gent or merely accidental conduct.”203 The Florida offense at issue 
in Leocal, driving under the influence (DUI) and causing serious 
bodily harm, is like felony battery: “Though both offenders intend 
their actions—mere touching and driving—neither intends the acci-
dental or negligent consequences . . . .”204 Synthesizing both Leocal 
and Flores, the Vail-Bailon panel found that “when we discuss an 
action that normally does not cause bodily injury . . . that element of 
a crime can qualify the crime as a ‘crime of violence’ under the ‘el-
ements clause’ only if the offender engages in it with some type of 
intent to harm another.”205 
                                                                                                             
 197 See Id. at 1096. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 1095. 
 201 Id. at 1096. 
 202 Id. at 1095. 
 203 Id. at 1097. Leocal was addressing the elements clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), 
which is substantially similar to the ACCA’s elements clause. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 
543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). 
 204 Vail-Bailon II, 838 F.3d at 1097. 
 205 Id. 
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Thus, the majority focused on whether the act of touching re-
quired the proper degree of force, while the dissent favored a back-
ward-looking analysis, assuming that a touch causing an injury was 
different from a touch that did not.206 At the end of the day, the Vail-
Bailon panel found that a touch is a touch—and because the touch 
in felony battery is no more “likely” or “intended” to result in injury 
than simple battery, Johnson I dictated that felony battery could not 
satisfy the elements clause.207 The dispute, however, was far from 
over. 
D. The En Banc Decision in Vail-Bailon 
The tension in the Eleventh Circuit over the proper elements 
clause analysis came to a head when the court reheard Vail-Bailon 
en banc.208 In a 6–5 decision, the court held that felony battery cat-
egorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the elements 
clause.209 
Like the dissent in the original panel opinion, the en banc ma-
jority shunned the Flores analysis in favor of a pure “capability” 
test.210 In the majority’s view, adopting the Flores definition would 
disregard the capability standard explicitly articulated in Johnson 
I.211 The majority reasoned that “having cited Flores, the Supreme 
Court was aware of how the Seventh Circuit had defined physical 
force, but the Court deliberately opted for a different definition.”212 
Thus, while the panel opinion viewed the Flores analysis as a har-
monious clarification of what “capable of causing physical injury” 
                                                                                                             
 206 Id. at 1100 (Siler, J., dissenting). Judge Jordan filed a concurring opinion 
explaining that the Court’s unpublished decisions about felony battery in Eady, 
Eugene, and Crawford “are flawed and do not constitute persuasive authority,” 
because none of these cases considered that a touch was the least culpable conduct 
under the statute. Id. at 1098–99 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
 207 Id. at 1098. The majority left for another day the question of whether felony 
battery committed through a “strike” satisfies the elements clause. Id. at 1099 
(Jordan, J., concurring). 
 208 See generally Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 209 Id. at 1308. 
 210 See id. at 1301. 
 211 Id. (“[I]f the Supreme Court in [] Johnson [I] had intended to adopt a like-
lihood-based standard found in Flores, it would have simply said so, and not con-
fused the reader by articulating a test that it never intended to be used.”). 
 212 Id. 
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means, the en banc majority viewed Flores as an opposing stand-
ard.213 
Moreover, the en banc majority rejected the argument that its 
decision would swallow Johnson I’s holding that the touch required 
for a simple battery is not “capable of” causing physical injury.214 
The majority reasoned that “[t]his argument rests on a faulty premise 
that every slight touch is always capable of causing pain or injury,” 
and distinguished between “a statute requiring nothing more than a 
slight touch” and “a statute requiring a touch that is forceful enough 
to cause great bodily harm.”215 Furthermore, the en banc majority 
was unpersuaded by the same hypotheticals that the panel majority 
had found convincing because the factual scenarios proposed in the 
hypotheticals had never occurred in Florida caselaw.216 In its view, 
the hypotheticals were far-fetched and incorrectly applied the least-
culpable-act rule.217 Thus, the en banc majority did not believe that 
a touch was a touch. Instead, the resulting injury required by the 
felony battery statute necessarily meant that the touch was “capable 
                                                                                                             
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. (emphasis added). 
 216 Id. at 1305–06. 
To our knowledge, there is likewise no case in which tapping, 
tickling, or lotion-applying—or any remotely similar con-
duct—has been held to constitute a felony battery under Florida 
Statute § 784.041. Rather, the real-world examples of Florida 
felony battery we are aware of all involve conduct that clearly 
required the use of physical force, as defined by [] Johnson 
[I] . . . . [T]he type of touching that has resulted in felony battery 
convictions is more along the lines of strangling, dragging, and 
biting. 
Id. at 1306 (citations omitted). 
 217 Id. There is currently a circuit split on whether the plain language of a stat-
ute, without a supporting case, can establish the least culpable act under a statute. 
Compare United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257, 1274–75, 1275 n.23 (10th Cir. 
2017), Swaby v. Yates, 847 F.3d 62, 66, 66 n.2 (1st Cir. 2017), Jean-Louis v. U.S. 
Attorney Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 481 (3d Cir. 2009), United States v. Lara, 590 F. 
App’x 574, 584 (6th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 849, 
849 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007), with United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218, 222 
(5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
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of” causing injury.218 In other words, a touch under the felony bat-
tery statute is more “forceful” than a touch under the simple battery 
statute.219 
Judge Wilson’s dissent, by contrast, argued that the touches 
were the same, and criticized the majority’s capability analysis as 
“announc[ing] that just one sentence in [] Johnson [I] matters.”220 In 
the dissent’s view, the majority’s test “turns not on the amount of 
force an act involves but rather on the possible consequences of the 
act. Degree of force is irrelevant.”221 The dissent favored a simpler 
reading of Johnson I that focused on the degree of contact used. 
Thus, limited contact like taps, touches, and pinches did not qualify 
as force, while kicks, strikes, punches, and similar degrees of contact 
did.222 To the dissent, the “capable of” statement, when read in con-
text with the rest of Johnson I’s force analysis, was meant to under-
score that “physical force” means “a substantial degree of force”—
not “that all contact that is capable of causing pain or injury is ‘phys-
ical force.’”223 Thus, to the dissent, the case was straightforward: 
“[f]elony battery can be committed by a mere touching, and [] John-
son [I] told us that a mere touching . . . . is not a crime of vio-
lence.”224 
                                                                                                             
 218 Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d at 1301. Moreover, because the majority believed 
the felony battery touch amounted to “physical force” and the touch is intentional, 
they rejected the argument that the statute does not require the “use of” physical 
force under Leocal. Id. at 1307. 
 219 Id. at 1301. 
 220 Id. at 1309 (Wilson, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenbaum also filed a dissent, 
which was, in large part, also joined by Judge Jordan and Judge Martin. Id. at 
1314–23 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenbaum’s en banc dissent agrees 
with Judge Wilson’s Johnson I interpretation as well, with an additional focus on 
the meaning of “use” in the elements clause under cases like Leocal. Id. at 1315–
18. She argues that it is not enough that the felony battery touch be committed 
intentionally, but that the causation-of-harm prong also requires a mens rea ele-
ment. Id. at 1317. However, the Leocal point is less significant where the dispute 
comes down to the nature of the touch itself, given that the touch is volitional. Id. 
at 1322. 
 221 Id. at 1309 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 222 Id. at 1310. 
 223 Id. at 1313. 
 224 Id. at 1314. Judge Wilson aptly illustrated his position with the following 
example: 
If, while walking down the street, you tap a jogger on the shoul-
der and the tap startles him, causing him to trip, hit his head, 
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At the end of the day, each side believed its definition of physi-
cal force reflected the purest reading of Johnson I. While five judges 
believed that the Johnson I Court intended the capability phrase to 
underscore the strong degree of force required, six believed that the 
Johnson I Court instead meant that an elements clause analysis 
should begin and end with capability.225 Consequently, on rehearing 
en banc, the Eleventh Circuit changed course and held that felony 
battery categorically requires the use of violent “physical force.”226 
E. A Touch that Unintentionally Results in Injury Does Not 
Require Violent “Physical Force” 
The Eleventh Circuit’s dispute about felony battery reflects a 
fundamental disagreement about the proper reading of Johnson I’s 
“physical force” definition. Because the felony battery statute com-
prises a volitional act that, by itself, requires minimal contact cou-
pled with an unintentional but serious physical consequence, it pro-
vides the ideal vehicle for the Supreme Court to resolve this disa-
greement. Both sides agree that under Johnson I, a mere touch, with-
out more, cannot satisfy the elements clause. However, they disa-
gree on whether the consequences that flow from that touch affects 
the elements clause analysis.227 
In Mr. Vail-Bailon’s case, the Eleventh Circuit provided at least 
three possible answers to this question. First, the original panel ma-
jority believed that the Supreme Court clarified its capability analy-
sis by citing Flores’ analysis and stated that a mere touch was not 
                                                                                                             
and suffer a concussion, have you committed a violent act? 
Most would say no. But if you punch the jogger and the punch 
causes him to fall, hit his head, and suffer a concussion, you 
have undoubtedly committed a violent act. The difference be-
tween a non-violent and violent act, then, is the degree of force 
used. Both a tap and a punch are capable of causing great bodily 
harm, but a tap involves a limited degree of force while a punch 
involves a substantial degree of force. Or, in the words of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, a punch involves “physical force.” 
Id. at 1308. 
 225 See generally Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d 1293. 
 226 Id. at 1307. Recently, the Eleventh Circuit applied Vail-Bailon’s felony 
battery holding to the ACCA. United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846, 869 (11th 
Cir. 2017). 
 227 See Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d at 1304, 1308; id. at 1308–09 (Wilson, J., dis-
senting). 
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likely to result in injury, even if it actually did.228 Second, the panel 
dissent and the en banc majority believed that the Supreme Court 
intended its capability language to stand alone and to capture all of-
fenses “capable of” causing physical injury, necessarily including 
offenses that result in that injury.229 The best answer, however, lies 
in the third option—the en banc dissent authored by Judge Wilson. 
Judge Wilson’s dissent argues that the capability analysis, read 
in context with the entirety of Johnson I’s emphasis on substantial, 
violent force, was meant to underscore the strong degree of force 
required by the elements clause.230 He notes that the “capable of” 
language derives meaning from [the force] analysis surrounding 
it.”231 To illustrate that point, Judge Wilson provides a more natural, 
contextualized reading of Johnson I’s “physical force” definition by 
adding his own bracketed text around the “capable of” language: 
[T]he phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force 
[read a substantial degree of force]—that is, force 
[read a degree of power] capable of causing physical 
pain or injury to another person.232 
Any other reading of the “capable of” language would essen-
tially write out the emphasis on violence found throughout Johnson 
I.233 Contrary to the view espoused by the en banc majority, an in-
terpretation that “physical force” includes any offense “capable of” 
causing physical injury — with no additional context — would, in-
deed, swallow Johnson I’s holding.234 Under that definition, one 
would be hard-pressed to come up with any offense that would not 
hold at least a possibility of causing injury or pain.235 And, under 
that definition, “a mere touching does constitute ‘physical force’” 
                                                                                                             
 228 Vail-Bailon I, 838 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2016). The Flores likelihood 
analysis was essentially a heightened version of the capability test, rather than a 
pure degree-focused examination of the act of contact. 
 229 Id. at 1100 (Silver, J., dissenting); Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d at 1302. 
 230 Id. at 1312–13 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 231 Id. at 1313. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. See generally Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133 (2010). 
 234 Vail-Bailon II, 868 at 1313. 
 235 Id. at 1314 (“Many forms of non-violent conduct have the capacity to cause 
pain or injury; pinching and tapping, for example, both can at the very least result 
in a person suffering pain.”). 
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because a touch is theoretically “capable of” causing pain or in-
jury.236 But as Judge Wilson aptly put it, “[a] spitball that happens 
to cause great bodily harm is still just a spitball. A mere touching 
that happens to cause great bodily harm is still just a mere touch-
ing.”237 
Thus, it makes little sense that the Supreme Court would create 
a test that would dictate the opposite conclusion of its own hold-
ing.238 Given that the Supreme Court “took the time to pen a thor-
ough discussion of ‘physical force’ . . . [w]e should take that entire 
discussion into account. When we do, it is apparent that the [capa-
bility] sentence does not discard degree of force for a capacity 
test.”239 Although Johnson I held that a mere touch is not enough 
force,240 there is significant disagreement over the proper form that 
an elements clause analysis should take: a degree-of-force focus or 
a capability-of-causing-injury focus. Although Stokeling will pro-
vide guidance on the amount of force required, Florida robbery has 
no harm element.241 Therefore, it may not resolve the issue ad-
dressed in Vail-Bailon. Given the Supreme Court’s silence on this 
issue and the significant need for greater guidance on the elements 
clause analysis, the Supreme Court should review the Florida felony 
battery issue to clarify whether an offense that requires great bodily 
                                                                                                             
 236 Id. 
Any unwanted touching could cause pain or injury. A tap on a 
pedestrian’s shoulder could distract the pedestrian causing her 
to collide with another person and suffer injury. A student’s 
spitball could hit its victim in the eye causing injury. A pat on 
the back could startle the victim causing her to jerk her body 
and suffer pain. A child’s innocent pinching of his friend could 
cause the friend to experience a sharp pain. 
Id. 
 237 Id. at 1312. Judge Wilson also rejected the en banc majority’s view that the 
hypotheticals involving touches that resulted in great bodily harm were far-
fetched—one, because the hypotheticals were realistic scenarios in his view, and 
two, because the text of the felony battery statute and Florida courts explicitly 
defined the act as a touch. Id. at n.4. 
 238 Id. at 1313. 
 239 Id. at 1314. 
 240 Id.; Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 
 241 § 812.13(1), FLA. STAT. (2017). 
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harm necessarily requires the use of “a substantial degree of 
force.”242 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To be sure, this is a touchy subject. The social and economic 
stakes are high. These issues affect thousands of individuals now 
and into the future, consigning them to years of additional impris-
onment. The disagreements throughout the circuits show there are 
no easy answers. Indeed, this tug-of-war has forced the Supreme 
Court to step in. Certainly, violent individuals deserve stiff sen-
tences. However, the desire to see violent individuals punished does 
not give courts license to disregard the Supreme Court’s directives 
about the application of the elements clause. Hopefully, the Su-
preme Court will use Stokeling as an opportunity to illuminate what 
it meant in Johnson I — that “physical force” requires a substantial 
degree of force. 
 
                                                                                                             
 242 Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140 (2010). 
